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Executive summary
• The European Union’s capital markets union (CMU) plan is in urgent need of a 
revamp. Because of Brexit, EU capital markets and supervision need to become more 
integrated. The ongoing deep recession increases the need for equity finance mobilised by 
capital markets. 
• The eleven EU countries in central and south-eastern Europe which joined the EU in 
2004 and after (EU11) are particularly affected by the ongoing consolidation of exchanges, 
which has diminished liquidity in smaller markets and in the traded securities of mid-
sized companies.
•  Corporate funding remains even more bank-dependent in the EU11 than in the 
rest of the EU. Equity capital, whether in the form of listed shares or directly supplied 
by investment funds, is particularly underdeveloped. Even though the sustained and 
superior growth record in the region compared to the rest of the EU should be a magnet 
for investors, cross-border exposure to traded equity in the region remains very limited. 
•  To gain broader acceptance in all EU countries, CMU will need to support 
more forcefully funding for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and foster market 
integration throughout the single market, including outside the euro area. 
•  The immediate priorities for the EU should be to revise market regulation and 
facilitate capital market access by smaller firms. Lighter standards in dedicated SME 
markets should be widened for newly-listed companies, but should not be available to 
more mature listed companies. In this way, high standards of transparency and integrity, 
which have been bolstered by post-financial crisis regulation, will be preserved. 
•  The EU11 countries need to embrace corporate governance rules and greater 
transparency of company financial data, which would facilitate equity finance. They must 
also attract investors who will seek disclosure of environmental, social and governance 
performance of issuers. Much could be done to foster liquidity on national exchanges, 
including by embracing the inevitable further consolidation of exchanges and other 
infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
The European Union’s 2015 plan for a capital markets union (CMU) had two main goals: to 
improve access for companies to non-bank finance, thereby diversifying sources of corporate 
funding and making them more resilient in crises; and to make markets more efficient and 
more integrated across the EU. By the spring of 2019, ten legislative proposals from this 
original programme had been agreed or adopted, even though actual outcomes in terms of 
financing patterns and market fragmentation were little changed. Despite this progress, a 
somewhat technical agenda had failed to capture the public imagination.
A new phase of the CMU is about to start, and might well resonate more strongly within 
EU countries. Regulation of the London capital markets will soon diverge from that of the EU. 
This will likely underline the United Kingdom’s deep integration with the EU in all areas of 
non-bank finance, including the fintech sector. Moreover, Europe’s Green Deal will require 
greater mobilisation of long-term and sustainable finance, sources of which within the EU 
are still scarce. Also, in the wake of the 2020 recession there will be a much greater need to 
replenish corporate equity, addressing the imminent solvency crisis of companies in several 
EU countries. As financial instruments benefiting companies have been heavily cut back 
in the EU budget covering the period up to 2027, such finance will need to rely on private 
sources to a greater extent than previously anticipated.
In the 11 EU members of central and south-eastern Europe (EU11), which joined the EU 
in 2004 and after, financial systems have been built from scratch over the past thirty years. 
Banking networks are well-established but when adjusted for GDP, the size of capital markets 
in these countries is still only about one third of the pre-Brexit EU average. 
To date these countries have remained on the side lines of the debate about further 
development and integration of EU capital markets, though their interests should be reflected. 
Their corporate sectors are predominantly composed of SMEs, leading to different priorities 
for non-bank finance. Also, their stock markets have continued their structural declines, 
listing fewer and only the largest companies. In future, cross-border investment flows and 
market liquidity will need to take on a greater priority relative to the objective of preserving 
local market infrastructures. 
Governments in the region are in principle committed to further capital market 
development. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania, among others, have agreed specific 
plans with market participants to this end. Capital market funding, including venture capital 
and equity finance for SMEs, is seen as a source of risk-oriented, long-term capital that is 
crucial to productivity growth. A number of countries in the region seek to develop ‘green’ 
financial instruments, and the governments of Poland and Hungary have issued sizable green 
bonds on international debt markets. 
From the standpoint of the rest of the EU, the EU11 countries are an important destination 
for banking assets and foreign direct investment (FDI). Diversifying financial markets within 
these countries will bolster financial stability and help the corporate sector rely less on bank 
finance. Moreover, six of the 11 countries remain outside the euro area and do not benefit 
from the mechanisms for risk sharing and common standards in bank supervision developed 
within the banking union. 
This Policy Contribution takes stock of the development of capital markets in the EU11, 
and proposes priorities for local market development and EU-level regulatory reform. We also 
propose an approach that could shape the next phase of CMU and foster market development 
and EU integration that involves these countries more fully than so far. 
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2 An ambition for more diverse financial 
markets 
Capital market development became a policy priority for the EU11 countries only recently. 
Until the 2008 financial crisis, the expansion in domestic financial assets in those countries 
was almost entirely down to the rapid expansion of banks, based on the deepening 
engagement of European cross-border banks. In the early years of economic transition a 
bank-based financial system served countries in the region well, as capacity in local banks 
was minimal, and as the largely unbanked population required a widely dispersed branch 
network offering simple retail banking services1. 
The immediate post-crisis period then saw a sudden reassessment of this financial 
openness. Rapid expansion of banking assets and the risky lending practices of foreign-
owned bank subsidiaries had resulted in a number of system-wide risks. For example, foreign 
currency-denominated lending to households led to several restructurings of mortgage 
liabilities imposed by governments. Between 2008 and about 2016 a protracted deleveraging 
of foreign bank exposures set in, which was much sharper than in any other emerging 
market region. Local regulators became much more sceptical about the financial stability 
implications of foreign-owned banks. Countries including Hungary and Poland adopted 
explicit policies to raise domestic ownership in the sector, including by state-owned banks. 
Ring-fencing of liquidity, and restrictions on dividend repatriations complicated the free 
flow of capital within banking networks, and this was likely further motivated by the need 
to design local bank resolution schemes with only national fiscal resources as the ultimate 
backstop (Lehmann, 2019). 
Meanwhile, the role of local markets in stabilising funding for companies became more 
apparent2. The COVID-19 crisis may now have further reinforced interest in local capital 
market development. Early survey evidence indicated that with the onset of the 2020 crisis, 
banks expected to further step up deleveraging, which would widen gaps between credit 
demand and supply (EIB, 2020). Yet, as euro-area and US monetary policy eased, emerging 
markets, including in central Europe, have experienced a surprising inflow of portfolio capital 
into government and private bond markets. Companies with an equity listing found it easier 
to access investors than those which did not, underlining that capital markets provide an 
additional and stabilising financing option (AFME, 2020). 
2.1 Funding diversification and market integration
The EU’s CMU plan was in part intended to address the financial-sector vulnerabilities 
exposed by the 2010 crisis. However, the EU11 countries seem to have made barely any 
progress towards the dual goals of diversification of funding and integration of markets. 
The external funding of companies remains overwhelmingly dependent on bank loans. 
Debt securities amount to only 2.4 percent of overall company balance sheets in the EU11, 
while loans and trade credit amount to over 70 percent (2017 data, Eurostat). In Poland, the 
region’s most developed equity market, corporate equity issuance amounted to no more than 
0.3 percent of GDP on average over the seven years to 2016, a period during which the ratio of 
private credit to GDP rose by ten percentage points. Surveys of enterprise funding preferences 
suggest that these very limited liability positions are matched by scant appetite for non-bank 
finance, in particular external equity which would realign ownership rights. 
An International Monetary Fund index of access to market finance provides a broad 
1  A number of studies have underlined the benefits to the region of integration with foreign banking networks for 
both financial stability, and overall growth; see EBRD (2009).
2  See European Commission (2017), which confirms the that corporate bond issuance substituted for the decline in 
bank lending following the 2010 financial crisis.
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measure of the capitalisation of mid-sized firms (other than the largest listings) and shows 
that for the region as a whole, capital markets have in fact become less relevant (Svirydzenka, 
2016). This development is in stark contrast to the financial deepening brought about by 
the greater use of banking services, on which the EU11 have nearly converged to western 
European levels (Figure 1). 
This continued market underdevelopment, coupled with the dependence on bank 
finance, results in higher financing costs. It also exposes younger and more innovative firms 
to restricted and uncertain funding because such firms are, because of the lack of collateral, 
more constrained in accessing bank funding. 
Figure 1: Access to financial institution and market funding, EU11 and seven other 
euro-area countries
Source: IMF. Note: Financial access is measured as an index between 0 (lowest development) and 1 (highest) of private sector credit 
and other assets; the index for financial institutions reflects availability of banking services; financial market access reflects smaller 
companies’ capitalisation and number of issuers. Unweighted averages within each country grouping. The euro-area group includes 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands. 
Progress towards the CMU goal of financial integration has also been limited. The cross-
border liability positions of banking groups, and the provision of services through local 
subsidiaries, remain substantial. Following a sustained period of deleveraging between 2009 
and 2016 external liabilities to non-resident banks stabilized, and remained at roughly $350 
billion for the entire region at end-2019. 
Cross-border exposures are substantial in terms of FDI, but non-resident investors have 
relatively limited positions in local debt and equity markets (Figure 2). Foreign investors 
have steadily built up positions on local bond markets (where foreign investors’ share of 
government bond markets is substantial) (Figure 3). In tradeable equity, this integration has 
been much more limited, and the share of the advanced EU countries in inward investment is 
much lower than it is in bond markets3. This is surprising given that the sustained high growth 
rates in the region up to early 2020 should have attracted much greater flows into the listed 
shares of EU11 countries.
Integration through capital markets could be particularly attractive for the EU11 countries 
because non-resident investors would offer a greater variety of investment products and 
supporting services, which are often not present in central and south-eastern Europe. 
Cross-border equity ownership would temper country-specific income shocks. This could 
be particularly important for the six EU11 countries in the euro area – which lack the 
independent shock absorption of their own currency – and for Croatia and Bulgaria, given 
their rigid exchange rate regimes. 
3  Figures for net inflows into dedicated emerging market funds even show outflows of portfolio equity (EBCI, 2020). 
The IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment survey suggests that advanced EU countries account for 72 percent of 
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Many factors explain this continued fragmentation, including the lack of transparency of 
listed and unlisted firms, withholding taxes, corporate governance practices and insolvency 
procedures that discourage cross-border ownership (IMF, 2019). An already limited local 
investor base has been further diminished as private pension funds have been curtailed 
throughout the region.
Figure 2: Liability position with the rest of the world, 2019, % of GDP
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 3: Cumulative flows of portfolio investment into the EU11, $ billions, 
beginning 2013
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3 Priorities for local capital market 
development
The next phase of CMU will coincide with the recovery from the current deep recession, 
which has already undermined company solvency, especially that of SMEs. The EU11 
countries on the whole show modest corporate leverage ratios and lower corporate debt 
than in western Europe. Companies are therefore well positioned to withstand the deep 
but temporary demand contraction (Table 1). Poland, for instance, has previously not 
experienced a recession in almost thirty years and corporate working capital and liquidity 
positions have been bolstered by export-led earnings. Even after the end of the lockdowns of 
the first half of 2020, periodic restrictions on economic activity, travel and labour mobility, 
and on retail spending, may continue to diminish these buffers. Alongside other objectives, 
equity finance will therefore need to be a priority in capital market development, in particular 
for SMEs. 
Table 1: Debt of EU non-financial corporations
Debt/GDP (%) Debt/equity (%)
2010 2018 2010 2018
EU11
Bulgaria 117 83 96 60
Czechia 44 47 43 57
Estonia 95 73 63 43
Hungary 88 66 72 47
Poland 39 46 49 62
Romania 53 33 88 63
Slovakia 44 55 59 92
Other euro area
Austria 93 92 102 86
Belgium 138 153 61 73
Finland 108 116 72 70
France 112 153 56 50
Germany 56 57 71 71
Greece 67 59 221 100
Italy 82 69 93 69
Netherlands 146 166 68 64
Portugal 127 101 93 71
Spain 140 96 89 47
Euro area 98 103 72 59
EU 27 96 100 70 58
Source: Eurostat.
3.1 Opening to private equity participations
Even though liquid equity markets are the ultimate aim, private equity investment may need 
to be developed to prepare companies to meet public listing requirements. In many emerging 
markets, the development of private equity has proven to be a catalytic intermediary stage 
in developing risk capital. This is because the efficiency and governance changes brought 
about by the involvement of private equity investors are essential for the few companies that 
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ultimately manage a listing on public equity markets. 
Private equity is of course controversial because of the deep governance and operational 
changes it brings to investee companies. Established owners may be marginalised, and 
managers replaced or subjected to tougher performance criteria. There are also concerns 
about excessive leverage (ECB, 2020). At the same time, by the time the private equity 
investor exits, investee companies have generally established a successful track record, and 
have reformed governance and financial reporting in a way that will make these companies 
attractive for public markets. Evidence from the wider emerging Europe region shows that 
companies with such private investors perform significantly better in terms of employment 
and productivity growth (EBRD, 2015).
That said, emerging Europe remains a backwater for private equity funds. Within this 
broadly defined region, private equity funds raised only €1.4 billion in 2019, or roughly 1.3 
percent of the European total, and actual investment activity accounted for roughly three 
percent of the European total (which itself is relatively modest compared to European GDP). 
Investments represented barely a tenth of a percent of GDP in the region on average, which is 
a fifth of the same ratio in the leading EU markets such as France and the Netherlands4.
Private equity investors typically operate from local offices within each market, 
performing extensive due diligence on potential investee firms. The scarcity of potential 
targets, and hence of investors, in central Europe is explained by poor corporate disclosure 
and corporate governance practices, and by the resistance of established owners to outside 
equity. 
A local investor base can only emerge gradually, and only based on significant reforms 
of the pensions and insurance sectors. Problems related to corporate governance regimes 
(specifically investor protection), the transparency of company financial information and 
contract enforcement should be addressed. Furthermore, national development banks 
should tighten their equity programmes to ensure that their often generous investments are 
additional and do not displace private fund managers. 
3.2 Promoting public equity listings on viable exchanges 
Capital market reform in central and south-eastern Europe crucially requires defining a future 
for local stock exchanges. All countries in the region have a local exchange, though several are 
essentially dormant, registering barely any trades. 
On the bond market, issuance and trading is significant for government bonds and, more 
recently, bonds of banks and municipalities, while corporate bond capitalisation as a share 
of GDP remains in the single digits in all countries (European Commission Expert Group on 
Corporate Bonds, 2017). 
On local equity markets, issuance volumes and trading have generally declined, and 
have become more concentrated in the key exchanges of Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. 
While many exchanges listed initially a large number of firms, often stemming from the early 
waves of market-based privatisation, many firms have since de-listed, or are not traded. Only 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic show meaningful share turnover ratios, though 
trading is concentrated in a small number of companies that constitute the main indices 
(Table 2). Low liquidity is a serious obstacle in attracting new issuers and institutional 
investors, as the inability to trade without sparking large price swings results in discounts for 
the primary issuer, and higher cost of equity funding.
With the exception of the Warsaw and Budapest exchanges, stock exchanges in the region 
have not become a meaningful source of equity capital for local companies. In total, €400 
million in new equity was raised between 2017 and 2019 from 83 listings (though nearly half 
of that volume was down to one listing in Estonia). This is of course insignificant relative to 
total GDP in the region (almost €1,500 billion in 2019). Moreover, there is an ongoing trend 
of de-listings and share-buybacks. Warsaw, the largest exchange in the region, listed an 
4  Figures from Invest Europe (2020).
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additional 65 companies between 2017 and 2019, of which all but 16 were on the junior SME 
market. Over the same period, 131 companies withdrew their listings (Table 3). New business 
has been declining, with Polish pension fund reform significantly curtailing the institutional 
investor base. Foreign investors account for about 60 percent of trading on the main market, 
though only a minor share of trading on the SME-oriented New Connect market.






of shares traded 
(%GDP)
Turnover ratio, 
value of shares 





2010 2019 2010 2019 2010 2019 2010 2019
Poland 39.8 25.6 14.5 8.5 36.4 33.2 570 798
Hungary 21.1 20.4 20.2 5.4 95.5 26.4 48 44
Czech Republic 17.4 .. 10.6 .. 78.9 14.6 16 ..
Slovak Republic 4.6 .. 0.3 .. 7.4 .. 90 ..
Bulgaria 14.6 .. 0.7 0.3 5.1 1.1 390 262
Croatia 42.8 37.2 1.8 0.5 4.1 1.5 240 119
Romania 8.5 10.4 1 0.8 11.8 7.8 73 81
Slovenia 19.6 14.7 1 0.3 5.1 1.9 72 29
Source: World Bank, based on FESE. 
Table 3: IPOs by volume and number of listings and de-listings, 2017-19 







Budapest 4 4 84 4.5 5
Warsaw 65 49 81 2.5 131
Prague 6 6 16,3 16.3 7
Nasdaq Tallin 3 0 191 0 1
Nasdaq Riga 2 1 3.3 3.3 8
Nasdaq Vilnius 3 1 25.7 3.6 2
Source: FESE. 
The long-term success of an exchange seems crucially to be determined by its early growth 
(Albuquerque de Sousa et al, 2017). Without a minimum number of listings and turnover 
early on, exchanges fail to attract further capital and quickly become dormant. Banking sector 
development and availability of a national savings pool appear to be important determinants. 
The banking sector development factor will favour the EU11; the lack of household savings, 
and of institutional investors that manage such savings, less so. The poor record of stock 
exchanges in central Europe therefore is in line with these findings from emerging markets. 
Issuance and trading appears increasingly concentrated in a small number of larger 
exchanges and in larger companies (OECD, 2016).
Most stock exchanges in emerging markets have become part of an international group 
structure, or pool their trading. Central Europe has been no exception. All three exchanges 
in the Baltics are owned by the international operator Nasdaq, and the Prague exchange 
belongs to the same group as its peer in Vienna. The small exchanges in the western Balkans 
now cooperate on key aspects of their operations, facilitating more liquid and integrated 
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trading, including with the smaller markets in non-EU candidate and accession countries5. 
Bucking this trend, the two largest exchanges in the region, Budapest and Warsaw, remain 
independent and in government ownership. 
Central European markets, and listed entities within these markets, are highly illiquid. 
This is a particular problem for SMEs, which by nature trade in small amounts, and whose 
owners might well be deterred from listing if illiquidity results in large discounts at the point 
of primary issuance. The trades that take place should be pooled in a single location, and 
be made available to as many investors as possible. The consolidation of stock exchanges is 
therefore sensible and could be complemented by the cross-border branching of exchanges, 
as proposed by the High Level Forum (2020). 
3.3 Infrastructure that fosters market integration 
In addition to increasing market liquidity, it is crucial to strengthen the market infrastructure 
in EU11 countries, making it more resilient to local risks, while overcoming fragmentation and 
reducing trading costs for international investors. 
The systems that govern clearing, payment and settlement are key components of 
financial market infrastructure. In the EU11, this infrastructure is fragmented, with every 
exchange having a central securities depository attached, though these depositories are 
largely limited to their national markets and settlement in foreign currency is often difficult.
Another key infrastructure component is central counterparties (CCPs). CCPs replace 
bilateral exposures between sellers and buyers with concentrated exposures to a single 
intermediary entity. This ensures the performance of open contracts, and significantly 
reduces counterparty risk. Clearly, this requires a capital cushion within the CCP and 
procedures for handling the possible default of a trading member. 
International consolidation is accelerating and most of the 16 CCPs licensed in the EU 
function as multinational entities, covering multiple markets across the region. For instance, 
exchange operator Nasdaq owns the three exchanges in the Baltic countries, and also services 
these with a single clearing house.  
The two independent CCPs in the EU11 in Warsaw and Budapest are among the smallest 
in the EU6. A single regional CCP would economise on capital requirements and reduce risks 
by combining trading members from various jurisdictions. International investors would 
have a single entry point to markets in the region. This would require building better linkages 
between the individual national exchanges and the CCPs in in Budapest and Warsaw. 
3.4 A framework for green capital markets
If EU11 capital markets are to become more open and vibrant, they must adapt to the much 
greater scrutiny of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues by international 
institutional investors. The United Nations-sponsored Principles for Responsible Investment, 
for instance, now count all major asset managers as members, and many have established 
ESG-oriented investment vehicles. The fiduciary duty of fund trustees towards asset owners 
is now commonly understood to include a review of invested assets against ESG principles 
(UNEP FI, 2019).
While EU11 governments have been resistant to ambitious EU climate targets, financial 
regulators appear to be increasingly engaged in the EU’s sustainable finance agenda. 
Lithuania and Hungary are in the process of developing sustainable finance frameworks, 
5  SEE Link is a project started by Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia and subsequently expanded to include the 
Ljubljana and Belgrade stock exchanges and two exchanges in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Local markets are integrate 
their IT systems, though without cross-ownership between the exchanges. This will ultimately allow investors 
easier access to regional markets through brokers in their home country. 
6  The CCP at the Budapest exchange cleared only about one tenth of the equity transactions registered in Warsaw 
(EBRD and Oliver Wyman, 2015), though it also clears electricity contracts across Europe, and appears to be more 
open to international trades. Two thirds of its clients were from outside Hungary, and it has recently established a 
partnership with the CCP in Kazakhstan.
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expecting to attract issuance also from other countries in the region. Poland and Hungary 
have been among the few governments to have issued sovereign green bonds, on the basis of 
new frameworks for monitoring and verifying the use of proceeds.
The EU sustainable finance strategy of 2018 had led to greater transparency. The disclosure 
regulation (EU 209/2088), relating to sustainability issues, will from 2021 apply to investment 
funds and financial advisers. But the main obstacle to attracting ESG-oriented investors to 
the EU11 region will lie in generating suitable projects and financing opportunities. Better 
disclosure by issuers is an important precondition. The EU non-financial reporting directive 
(2014/95/EU) will require the largest companies to apply the recommendations of the G20 
Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures. EU guidelines already call for such 
companies to disclose their carbon footprints (including those of their clients), and to set 
targets for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 2019). Capital 
market instruments that appeal to specialist investors, such as green bonds, will also need 
to target activities listed in the new EU taxonomy, which will become binding from 2021 (EU 
Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, 2020). The EU green bond framework is at 
time of writing still under discussion but is likely to set higher standards for verification of the 
use of funds raised, and will seek to contain risks of greenwashing. 
Even in the main EU markets, green bonds amount to only a small share of climate-related 
investment. As with other funding of investment, the bulk of financing is generated by banks. 
Once activities of bank borrowers are transparent, and loans are aligned with activities 
prescribed under the EU taxonomy, banks may be able to issue asset-backed securities, which 
would considerably expand banks’ refinancing options while generating assets that are more 
liquid than the bonds of individual issuers. 
The exchanges in Paris, Dublin and Luxembourg have attracted issuers and investors in 
green assets from across Europe. There is clearly a role for the exchanges in the central Europe 
region to cater to local investors and issuers. The exchange operators will need to promote 
standards for green products, services and benchmarks, and educate market participants. 
4 Central Europe’s stake in the future CMU 
The second phase of the CMU plan is underway7. To address the pressures on short-
term funding in the ongoing recession, the European Commission in July 2020 proposed 
amendments to rules on listing prospectuses, to the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID II, 2014/65/EU) and to securitisation rules, seeking to ease capital market 
access. 
For the EU11, adapting future capital market legislation to the requirements of smaller 
companies and their more illiquid investor bases is particularly relevant. The high fixed costs 
of listing, disclosure and complying with market conduct rules are particularly burdensome 
for smaller companies and justify simplified requirements. Compared to western Europe, 
the firm-size distribution in the EU11 is skewed towards smaller firms, with few potential 
candidates among mid-sized firms, of up to 500 employees. 
Capital markets legislation in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis had the 
overriding ambition of bolstering transparency and market integrity. As yet, the resulting 
extensive EU regulation of exchanges does not accommodate well the financing needs of 
SMEs. 
There have been some attempts to address these obstacles. More recent regulations 
and directives, and amendments to earlier provisions, have sought to foster market access 
7  ECMI (2019) and High Level Forum (2020), which made 17 proposals emphasising retail investment, and tackling 
some of the barriers outside the narrow field of capital market regulation, such as insolvency reform and taxation.
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and market liquidity. MiFID II has already created the so-called SME growth markets as a 
category of exchanges distinct from the higher-standard regulated markets, aiming to address 
the palpable market failures in the access of SMEs to capital markets (Thomadakis, 2017). 
The idea of easing regulation on a segment of an exchange for smaller companies as an 
alternative, or a precursor, to the main exchange listing is common in young capital markets. 
By mid-2020, 20 exchanges in the EU and the UK had been given this status, listing about 
1,700 companies (a further 14 exchanges also primarily target SMEs). London’s junior market 
AIM alone lists 40 percent of the total number of firms, and attracted numerous SME listings 
from across Europe. SME equity could therefore become quite shallow within the EU (SME 
bonds are in any case negligible, accounting for no more than single digit percentages of total 
corporate funding). 
Within the EU11, Warsaw’s New Connect is the largest such market, and companies in the 
Baltics access the integrated market based in Sweden. The Budapest Stock Exchange, through 
its SME market, also supports capacity building in young companies ahead of a listing. The 
state covers listing costs and provides liquidity for trading in these shares.
Subsequent EU legislation has built on the concept of SME exchanges and further reduced 
barriers for SMEs accessing capital markets. One such measure concerned the disclosure by 
listed SMEs of corporate officers with insider information under the market abuse regulation 
(EU 596/2014); another was the simplified requirements for the publication by smaller 
companies of listing prospectuses (Prospectus Regulation, 2017/1129). 
For potential issuers, a dedicated SME market offers a listing process and access to bond 
and equity finance at reduced costs and with reduced compliance requirements. Emerging 
markets have had mixed success with SME-focused exchanges. Only a small number of 
listings were done on the Asian SME exchanges. This may be because institutional investors 
seek primarily large and liquid listings. In the absence of an investor base, neither the junior 
nor the main segment of the market seems to prosper (Abraham and Schmukler, 2017). The 
record in the EU11 is sobering. After three years, the Zagreb trading platform for SMEs, which 
also covers Slovenia, and the junior market in Budapest only list a handful of SMEs each. 
A key question now is whether SME ‘growth markets’ should be further expanded. In an 
attempt to create liquidity, MiFID II allowed admission of regular larger companies into SME 
markets that benefit from streamlined requirements. But frequent corporate governance 
problems crop up with listed SMEs, which risk undermining investor confidence in the larger 
companies listed on regular exchanges. Liquidity should be fostered by the cross-border 
integration of markets (ECMI, 2019). 
Addressing illiquidity also entails addressing SMEs’ resistance to new owners. To that end, 
exchanges could allow the issuance of dual-class shares, which would protect established 
owners (see High Level Forum, 2020). However, these instruments do not offer the benefits 
provided by the ownership and stewardship of new investors. 
Finally, SME securities should be exempt from the requirement that fees for the execution 
of trades and the provision of research must be unbundled. Until MiFID II came into effect 
in 2018, brokers applied a single charge to asset managers for both the execution of trades 
and the provision of research. A concern with such ‘soft commissions’ was that opaque 
pricing for research would become an inducement for brokerage services. The unbundling of 
research from brokerage services under MiFID II was meant to address such market failures. 
However, the ambition for market efficiency seems to have come at the cost of access to non-
bank finance. There is clear evidence that access to capital market funding and liquidity in 
equities is closely related to research coverage, and that the scarcity of such research, which is 
typically provided by local brokers, can be a barrier to SME listings. Yet the unbundling seems 
to have led to a sharp decline in the research coverage of smaller and less frequently traded 
companies. Exempting SME securities from the unbundling requirement would foster access 
to equity finance, albeit at the cost of reintroducing some market distortions.
The record in the 
EU11 in SMEs is 
sobering. The Zagreb 
trading platform for 
SMEs, which also 
covers Slovenia, and 
the junior market in 
Budapest only list a 
handful of SMEs each
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4.1 Bank equity holdings
More complex EU regulation has clearly held back primary issuance and reduced liquidity 
in the EU11 capital markets. Many other obstacles are home-made. The absence of large 
domestic institutional investors, such as insurers and pension funds, remains a key 
constraint. For some time now, central European countries have curtailed the private pension 
funds which were set up in the 1990s, in particular with the full nationalisation of pension 
assets in Hungary in 2010, and limitations on the investment activities of Polish pension funds 
from 2015.  
This aggravates an already low level of household financial assets, estimated at roughly 100 
percent of GDP in the EU11, compared to over twice that ratio in the rest of the EU (AFME, 
2016). Private pension assets cannot be generated in the short term, and pension policy 
should not become an instrument of capital market development. Nevertheless, there are 
sensible suggestions about how supplementary occupational pensions could be offered in 
all member states (eg High Level Forum, 2020). EU countries that are furthest advanced in 
establishing funded pension schemes, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, also have some 
of the most liquid local capital markets. 
In the absence of other large investors, banks play a significant role in supporting liquidity 
in local equity markets. They do this by making buy and sell offers (‘making a market’) in 
equities, which would otherwise be highly illiquid. But also they often become holders of the 
equity of their clients, for instance after a debt restructuring. 
Equity holdings should not be a core part of banks’ business models, and for this reason 
justify stringent capital adequacy requirements. Under the Basel III framework, risk weights 
based on bank-internal models are to be abolished, and replaced by a standard risk weight 
that could be up to 400 percent for short-term holdings. This would make bank equity 
investments uneconomical and discourage the participation of banks in private equity and 
state-led equity funds. As the Basel III text offers considerable leeway in how equity holdings 
are treated, the European Commission may still have scope to introduce a less-stringent 
interpretation. 
5 Priorities at national and EU level 
The ongoing structural changes in international capital markets have favoured larger 
companies, which are suitable for index-based passive investing, and investment on larger 
and more liquid exchanges. Illiquidity in markets, and the lack of a private sector market 
‘ecosystem’, might now be aggravated as the UK leaves the EU single market. Past trends have 
disadvantaged smaller EU capital markets, including in the EU11 region, and have reinforced 
the ongoing de-listing of enterprises. EU11 markets are also poorly prepared for the growing 
investor appetite for ESG-based and green investment which will require strong disclosure, 
alignment with the EU environmental taxonomy and high corporate governance standards. 
Governments in central and south-eastern Europe have long called for more risk 
capital to support young and innovative companies. Yet, the dominance of bank funding is 
undiminished. Corporate insolvency looms in the wake of the COVID-19-induced crisis and 
equity capital, whether in listed shares or provided directly by investment funds, is needed 
more than ever.
This context calls for governments and regulators in central Europe to engage proactively 
in shaping the next phase of CMU. They should seek revisions in capital market legislation to 
better account for the needs of SMEs (especially in the MiFID II review, which is ongoing at 
time of writing). 
Specific regulatory provisions aimed at SMEs, such as the SME growth markets under 
MiFID II, may need to be expanded, without compromising the transparency and integrity 
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of the regular markets. Investors are clear that smaller and younger companies bring with 
them greater financial and corporate governance risks. In the ‘light-touch’ SME markets they 
should only find such enterprises, not more mature companies that have been mixed in to 
support liquidity. In this way regulation would offer a stepping stone towards fully-fledged 
capital market listing. Entry into SME markets and transition into the more mature markets 
may need to be supported. Financial support from public sources, whether from national 
public banks, or through the SME IPO fund that was proposed by the EU Commission, should 
be focused only on market failures. 
There is also a critical domestic agenda which includes revising corporate governance 
practices to encourage more outside investment and preparing enterprises for life as public 
companies (for instance through the numerous equity support programmes offered by 
national development banks). Many countries have rightly embraced consolidation of 
exchanges and other infrastructure and thereby eased access to institutional investors. 
The two largest exchanges in the EU11 remain independent and should seek alliances that 
similarly foster market access and liquidity. 
The rest of the EU would be well advised to foster capital market integration with central 
and south-eastern Europe, so that its investors can participate in sustained high growth in the 
region, and offer a plan that promotes risk sharing beyond the common currency area. 
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